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Exploiting two unexpected variations in sickness absence policy for civil servants, this article
assesses the relative importance of monetary disincentives vs. monitoring in addressing
absenteeism.1
Economic theory postulates that, for given outside options, there is a trade o® between
monetary incentives and stricter monitoring in determining workers' e®ort levels (Shapiro
and Stiglitz, 1984). A number of articles have investigated the existence of a such a rela-
tionship exploiting between ¯rms variation in employment relations (Cappelli and Chauvin,
1991; Groshen and Krueger, 1990; Rebitzer, 1995). They ¯nd a negative association between
stricter supervision and monetary incentives, suggesting that the two are substitutes rather
than complements in determining workers' e®ort. Nevertheless, the identifying variation
employed is hardly exogenous (Prendergast, 1999), since the empirical analysis relies on
equilibrium quantities resulting from ¯rms' and workers' optimization problem. Imprecise
measurement of monitoring intensity (commonly de¯ned as the ratio of supervisory to non
supervisory personnel) constitutes another potential threat to estimation. Both problems
can hardly be overcome with observational data, and further work has tried to tackle them
in a laboratory setting (Dittrich and Kocher, 2006), at the cost of a loss in results' generality.
Recently, a growing literature has turned to analyse separately the e®ects of incentives and
monitoring on workers' behavior,2 while their relative importance remains an unexplored
issue.
The goal of this paper is to ¯ll this gap looking at a basic measure of e®ort, presence
at work, and how this was a®ected by two subsequent variations in sickness absence policy
1I am indebted to M. Bryan, C. Nicoletti, P. Sestito and A. Rosolia for their invaluable help. I am
also grateful to C. Cameron, E. Ciapanna, M. Cozzolino, A. Del Boca, I. Faiella, A. Ichino, D. Miller, M.
Pellizzari, R. Torrini, G. Zanella, R. Zizza and seminar participants at Bocconi, Bologna, Padova (Brucchi
Luchino), Pavia (SIEP), Pescara (AIEL), Milano Statale, UC Davis for their useful comments. This article
summarises the results of my unpaid participation to the Absenteeism Commission of the Civil Service
Ministry - Italian Government. I am indebted to the other members of the Commission and of the technical
unit of the Ministry for their comments and their help with the data and the institutional setting.
2The positive impact of performance pay on productivity is widely documented (Bandiera et al., 2009;
Gielen et al., 2010; Lazear, 2000; Lavy, 2009), while evidence on monitoring is more scarce. Nagin et al.
(2002) show that a relevant fraction of call center operators shirk more when perceived monitoring levels
decrease. Evidence is more mixed in laboratory studies: Dickinson and Villeval (2008) ¯nd a positive impact
of monitoring on e®ort up to a certain threshold, above which motivation can be crowded out (Frey and
Jegen, 2001).
5entailing a changing mix of incentives and monitoring for Italian civil servants. Given asym-
metric information on actual health conditions, workers might try to reduce the amount of
work supplied by deciding to report sick even when their physical conditions are compat-
ible with work,3 a speci¯c dimension of shirking. The incidence of such an opportunistic
behavior depends on the worker's surplus at the current job (Barmby et al., 1994), on her
outside options (Askilden et al., 2005; Kaivanto, 1997) and on the likelihood associated with
the frequently absent worker being ¯red when caught, mainly determined by the monitoring
level and the degree of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) enjoyed (Arai and Thour-
sie, 2005; Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; Johansson and Palme, 2005; Lindbeck et al., 2006;
Riphahn, 2004). In this framework, higher absence rates are expected for civil servants,
given that they are less exposed to market forces and enjoy a higher level of e®ective EPL
compared to their private sector peers.
In the United States, 2.8 per cent of public sector workers reported to have worked less
than usual because of illness in the fourth quarter of 2007, 41.2 per cent higher an incidence
than in the private services sector. In Western Europe, this di®erence was equal to 20.2 per
cent.4 Italy is no exception, and in the same period sickness absence incidence was 49.1 per
cent higher in the public than in the private services sector.5 In order to reduce this wedge,
the just installed Italian government introduced a new, more restrictive, sickness absence
policy for civil servants at the end of June 2008. The new provision stayed in place for a
full year and introduced monetary disincentives with the loss of any allowance or bonus (on
average 20% of total wage) for the ¯rst ten days of sickness absence.6 At the same time,
the law increased monitoring e®ectiveness, changing from 4 to 11 hours the time interval in
which physicians' random inspections are carried out in order to check whether the worker
reporting to be sick is at home and to ascertain her real health conditions. The strategy
of the policy was thus twofold: increase the relative price of absence compared to going
to work and enhance monitoring e®ectiveness. After exactly one year, the provision was
3For a review of the literature see Brown and Sessions (1996). Markussen et al. (2010) provide extensive
evidence on the relevance of moral hazard issues in determining sickness absence levels.
4Author's calculations based on Current Population Survey data for the US (US-Census-Bureau, 2008)
and on EULFS data for Western Europe (Eurostat, 2008). Absence rates are equal to the incidence of
employees working less than usual in the reference week because of illness. Workers not working in the
reference week for reasons outside their will (labor dispute, bad weather, technical reasons, reduced activity)
are not included.
5Author's calculations on Italian Labour Force Data, following the same de¯nition of footnote 4; for
details see section 4.
6Henrekson and Persson (2004); Johansson and Palme (2005, 2002); Ziebarth (2009), among others,
analyse the impact of a change in replacement rates on the probability of reporting sick.
6partially amended for six months, with monitoring time intervals reduced to the pre-reform
period, while leaving unchanged sickness absence wage cuts. Compared to previous empirical
literature on incentives' e®ectiveness, this experimental setting has two major advantages.
The double unexpected variation in sickness absence policy provides clean evidence on the
importance of incentives relative to monitoring in determining workers' e®ort, while previous
papers based on an experimental setting focussed on only one of the two possible dimensions.
Moreover, such a clear identi¯cation is not obtained in a lab experiment, or limited ¯eld
study, but comes from a real-world employment relationship involving 3.5 million of workers
in 2007 (RGS, 2008), slightly more than one out of ¯ve employees in that year.
Using Italian Labour Force Survey data, a large dataset with more than 150 thousand
quarterly observations, the causal e®ect of the new policies on public sector workers' ab-
senteeism is identi¯ed by means of a regression di®erences in di®erences approach using
white collar private sector workers as the control group. When stricter monitoring was in-
troduced together with monetary disincentives, sickness-related absence rates in the public
sector fell by 0.66 percentage points (-26.4%) on average, eliminating the wedge with the
private services sector conditional on observables. The subsequent change in the policy mix
sheds light on the relative importance of monitoring compared to wage cuts in determining
workers' presence. When time intervals for monitoring were reset to the pre-reform level,
sickness absence rates rebounded, meaning that stricter monitoring is the driving force in
determining workers' attendance. Evidence survives a variety of robustness checks and is
not driven by attenuation bias. Moreover, no shift is detected to other types of absence as a
consequence of the reform. Given that sickness absence rates are higher in the public than
in the private sector in the US and Western Europe as well, these results provide useful
insights on how to draw a successful strategy for addressing absenteeism.
This article is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the experimental setting, while
a simple theoretical framework is introduced in section 3 to identify the drivers of sickness
absence rates' changes. Sections 4 and 5 respectively describe the data and the identi¯cation
strategy underlying the estimation of the causal e®ects of the reforms at study. Main results,
together with a number of robustness checks, are reported in section 6, while section 7
compares main results with evidence obtained from di®erent datasets and previous papers
analysing the reform. Section 8 concludes.
72 Experimental setting
During the period analysed here, sickness absence policy remained constant in the private
services sector, which will serve as the control group in the empirical analysis. The insurance
system is funded by both ¯rms and the Social Security Agency (SSA). For the ¯rst three
days of continuous absence, sick leave payments have to be made by the employer, and
their replacement rate is de¯ned by each contract. Starting with the fourth day and until
the twentieth day of absence, SSA pays 50 per cent of the worker's wage, a payment that
is usually matched by the employer in order to reach full coverage (but the actual level of
coverage can be di®erent according to the contract). For absence spells longer than 20 days,
SSA contribution increases to 67 per cent of the wage. Sick workers are required to produce
medical certi¯cates justifying their absence and to be at home 4 hours a day (10 to 12 am
and 5 to 7 pm) in order to receive random medical inspections, aimed at ascertaining their
presence at home and their real health conditions.
In the public sector, the treatment group, workers were entitled to receive the full wage
during sickness leave of any length before the reform at study was introduced.7 They were
also required, exactly as their private sector peers, to produce medical certi¯cates and to be
at home 4 hours a day to receive inspections. This policy had two subsequent changes, that
will be used to identify the relative importance of monitoring and incentives in determining
absence levels.
Phase 1 (July 2008 - June 2009): monetary disincentives and increase in monitoring
At the end of June 2008, the just installed Italian government established a new, more
restrictive, sickness absence policy, which stayed in place for a full year.8 The new provision
established that, for the ¯rst ten days of continuous absence, the worker on sick leave receives
the base salary only. Any allowance or bonus, 20% of total wage on average according to
RGS (2008), is thus lost until the 11th day of absence, when the worker reporting sick starts
to receive the full wage again. Few exceptions, con¯ned to the most serious cases of illness,
were warranted. At the same time, the law increased monitoring e®ectiveness, changing the
time interval in which the worker reporting to be sick had to be at home in order to be able
to receive random medical inspections (identical to those set for the private sector) from 4
to 11 hours. The strategy of the government was thus twofold: increase the relative price of
7Contractual arrangements could be di®erent in subsectors of the civil service.
8Decree No. 112 of June 25th, 2008; converted in Law 133/2008 the 6th of August, 2008.
8absence and enhance monitoring e®ectiveness.
Phase 2 (July 2009 - December 2009): monetary disincentives only, monitoring at the
pre-reform level
Exactly one year later (Decree No. 78 of July 1st, 2009) the government partially amended
the sickness absence policy. While monetary disincentives were not modi¯ed, the time
intervals for medical inspections returned to the pre-reform setting: 4 hours (10 to 12 am
and 5 to 7 pm).
Figure 1 provides evidence on the unexpectedness of the two policy changes, a crucial
assumption underlying identi¯cation of its causal e®ects. The ¯gure reports the incidence of
queries for the keyword "sickness absence" and "sickness absence checks"9 over total queries
performed through the Google search engine,10 with values normalized to 100 for the week in
which the incidence was the highest. It is evident that the interest for the keywords reaches
local maxima exactly in the weeks in which sickness insurance policy changed, starting
phase 1 and 2 of the reform, a clear sign that the reforms were unanticipated. Another
peak occurs at the end of October 2009, following anticipations made of a third phase
(not analysed here), in which monitoring time intervals would have changed again.11 The
eventual e®ect this announcement had on sickness absence dynamics in the last quarter of
2009 will directly be tested in the empirical analysis.
The introduction of the new policy regarding approximately 3.5 million of workers in 2007
(RGS, 2008), or slightly more than 20 per cent of employees, and its partial amendment,
provide an ideal experimental setting for evaluating the relative importance of monitoring
and monetary disincentives in determining absence behaviour. The next section introduces
a simple model, based on each worker utility maximization, clarifying the drivers of changes
in absence rates determined by the di®erent sick pay policies analised here.
9In Italian, "assenza per malattia" and "visite ¯scali" respectively.
10This indicator is publicly available at http://www.google.com/insights/search/.
11Colombo, D. "Brunetta lancia l'allarme: torna l'assenteismo", il Sole 24 Ore, October 30, 2009.
93 Theoretical background
Conditional on actual health conditions, and assuming the participation constraint is always
satis¯ed, the utility maximization problem for the risk-neutral worker is:
U(~ sjs) = sf(1 ¡ ~ s)(w0 ¡ ¯0) + ~ s(w1 ¡ ¯1)g + (1 ¡ s)f~ s(w1 + ° ¡ pK ¡ a) + (1 ¡ ~ s)w0g (1)
where actual and reported health status are de¯ned respectively by s, ~ s 2 f0;1g (one if
sick, zero otherwise). Actual health status (s) is assumed to be equal to one and zero
respectively with probability x and 1¡x, while reported health status is determined by the
maximization of equation 1 conditional on s. The term w0 denotes daily wage paid when
working and w1 is income transfer for employees absent from work because of sickness, with
w0 ¸ w1. The terms ¯0 and ¯1 identify the utility loss related to sickness respectively
when working or staying at home (with ¯0 > ¯1), ° is leisure utility when not working and
not sick, p is monitoring e®ectiveness, that is the probability of detecting workers cheating
over their health status, and K is the associated penalty. Finally, the term a identi¯es the
psychological cost of cheating. The share of workers declaring to be sick will then be:
E(~ s) = Pr(s = 1)fPr(w1 ¡ ¯1 > w0 ¡ ¯0)g + (1 ¡ Pr(s = 1))fPr(w1 + ° ¡ pK ¡ a) > w0)g (2)
It is straightforward to see that, conditional on actual health conditions, the fraction of
workers declaring to be sick is decreasing with the magnitude of the monetary disincentive for
sickness absence, with monitoring e®ectiveness, with the cost sustained when opportunistic
behaviour is detected and with the cheater's psychological cost. Before the reform at study
(superscript B), the worker received the same payment irrespective of sickness absence (wB
1 =
wB
0 ), while pB is monitoring e®ectiveness. During phase one of the reform (superscript






1 ) and monitoring
e®ectiveness was increased (pA1 > pB). As a consequence, assuming the probability that a
worker is actually sick remains constant across periods, the change in the share of workers
declaring to be sick during the phase 1 of the reform will be:
10E(~ sjA1) ¡ E(~ sjB) =
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A1K + a) ¡ Pr(° > p
BK + a)g (3)
in which the ¯rst addend in the right hand side characterises the contribution of the increase
in presenteeism due to the reform (i.e. sick workers going to work in order not to incur in the
penalty wB
0 ¡wA
1 > 0 introduced by the new regulations) to the change in overall incidence
of sickness absence. The second term characterises instead the contribution of the decrease
in absenteeism among cheaters, due to both the wage penalty and the increase in monitoring
e®ectiveness. Given the setting of the reform in phase one, it is then not possible to tell
whether the eventual change in sickness absence is due to an increase in presenteeism or a
decrease in opportunism. Nevertheless, in phase 2 (superscript A2), monitoring e®ectiveness
was reduced to the pre-reform level (pA2 = pB), while the payment for workers reporting sick






1 . As such, any change in the share of workers declaring to be sick between
phase 1 and phase 2 will be driven by the variation in monitoring e®ectiveness, being an
expression of the second term only of equation 3:
E(~ sjA2) ¡ E(~ sjA1) =










A1K + a)g: (4)
The relative size of absolute changes in average workers' sickness rates expressed in equations
3 and 4 provides a straightforward assessment of the relative importance of monitoring vs.
monetary incentives in determining absence rates. Under the assumption that monitoring
e®ectiveness is non-relevant for genuinely sick individuals, this formalization makes clear
that, while changes taking place between the period B and A1 could be driven both by an
increase in presenteeism and a decrease in opportunism, variations between A1 and A2 can
only be determined by opportunistic behaviour.
114 Data and descriptive statistics
The Italian Labour Force Survey (ILFS) is the quarterly dataset used in this study, providing
full information on the labour market status and other socio-economic characteristics of a
sample representative of the Italian population (for a description, see Ceccarelli et al. (2007)).
It is a short panel in which individuals are interviewed in two subsequent quarters and re-
interviewed again after one year in the same quarters, for a total of four times. In this article
24 quarters of data are used, spanning the six year interval 2004:Q1-2009:Q4, with a total
of more than 4 million observations. These data report respondents' current labour market
status and main socio-economic characteristics, constituting the main source for monitoring
labor market dynamics in Italy. Two questions are used for constructing the main dependent
variable, asking the reason why the respondent did not work at all during the reference week
(question B3), or worked less than usual during the reference week (question C34). Sickness
is one of the possible answers. The others are: Subsidised work sharing, Reduced activity for
economic or technical reasons, Strike, Bad weather, Annual leave, Bank holidays, Flexible
time schedule, Part-time, Study, Compulsory maternity leave, Voluntary parental leave,
Leave for family reasons, Reduced activity for other reasons, New job or job change during
the week, Work contract just expired. The main binary dependent variable is de¯ned as
follows:
- missing, thus not used for estimation, if the individual did not work (or worked less than
usual) for reasons outside her control (Subsidised work sharing at the ¯rm, Reduced activity
for economic or technical reasons, Strike, Bad weather, Bank holidays);
- zero if the worker worked as much as usual or if she worked less than usual for reasons
other than sickness;
- one if the worker worked less than usual (or did not work at all) because of sickness.
A symmetric indicator for other kinds of absence is equal to one if the individual worked
less than usual for reasons other than sickness, zero otherwise and missing if the worker
worked less than usual for reasons outside her control. Only white collar employees are
used for estimation, since there are almost no blue collar workers in the public sector.
Furthermore, the ¯nal sample does not include workers in the army, workers employed in
agriculture and manufacturing and those working in the education or health care sector.
This last selection rule is determined by the fact that it is not possible to discern whether
the worker is employed or not in the public sector, given the existence of private schools
12and hospitals.12 After this sample selection, 268,544 observations are left, or 25.2 per cent
of the total number of employees in the sample.
Figure 2 shows sickness absence incidence for the 2004:Q1-2009:Q4 period, separately
for the private services and the public sector. Public sector workers show constantly higher
absence rates, while the seasonal pattern is similar in the two subgroups. The ¯rst and
the second vertical lines identify the two subsequent changes in the civil servants' sickness
absence insurance system introduced in section 2. Graphical evidence shows that the dif-
ference in absence rates between the public and the private sector seems to decrease during
the phase 1 of the reform, while increasing again thereafter.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the private services sector (control group) and the
public sector (treatment group), for the period before (2004:Q1-2008:Q2) and after (2008:Q3-
2009:Q4) the introduction of the new sick pay policies. The distribution of workers across
educational levels is similar for the treatment and the control group, with the share of highly
educated individuals being around 20% (3 to 4 percentage points higher in the public sector).
The share of females is higher in the private services (around 51%) than in the public sector
(around 42%). This might seem surprising, but it is widely expected since education and
health care are not included in the public sector. Moreover, while public sector workers
are evenly distributed across the country, the private sector is concentrated in the North,
the area where female employment rates are the highest. Distribution by age is di®erent in
the two sectors, with civil servants being over-represented among older (45-64) workers and
under-represented among younger ones (15-34).
The incidence of workers reporting to have worked less than usual because of sickness
is equal to 2.6% in the public sector in the pre-reform period, 1 percentage point higher
than in the private sector. In the post reform period this incidence falls to 2%, still 0.7
percentage points higher than in the control group. Overall absence incidence (i.e. including
also absence for reasons other than sickness) is similar in the two groups. Simple average
comparisons thus highlight a much higher incidence of sickness absence among civil servants,
partially o®set by a lower incidence of absence for other reasons.
In order to better describe the patterns underlying absence, Table 2 shows the results
of a Linear Probability Model (LPM) regression for the probability of the individual worker
working less than usual for sickness during the reference week, estimated on the pre-reform
12The rest of the public sector is identi¯ed by individuals working for the Public Administration.
13period. The likelihood of being absent is positively associated with worker's age, tenure
and ¯rm size measured as the number of employees at the local unit. Higher probability
of reporting sick is found for females and where a Dependent Relative (DR)13 is present
in the household (column 1). Longer contractual hours are associated with less frequent
sickness absence, an opposite pattern compared to the rest of the literature on absence, that
can be explained by a positive selection of workers into contracts requiring longer hours
of work. The higher incidence of sickness absence in the public sector is con¯rmed when
controlling for composition e®ects, with the civil servants having 0.6 percentage points higher
probability of being absent from work in the reference week than otherwise observationally
equivalent private sector white collar workers.14 Column 2 shows the results of an additional
estimate, checking whether the higher propensity to report sick varies across subgroups of
civil servants. In particular, the model includes a set of interactions between gender and
presence of a DR in the family, a control for workers having a second job and higher level
interactions of these controls with the PUB dummy, equal to one if the worker is a civil
servant and zero otherwise. An interaction of PUB with the educational level is also included.
Men and women both show a similarly higher propensity to report sick when employed in
the public sector, the di®erence between the two being statistically not signi¯cant. Presence
of a DR in the household increases signi¯cantly the probability of a woman reporting sick
at work, while such an e®ect is not found for men. According to the non-signi¯cance of
the Female*PUB*DR interactions, this average e®ect is not statistically di®erent for public
sector females. The same applies when higher education is taken into consideration, while
workers having second jobs do not display a higher propensity to report sick, both on average
and in the public sector.
According to these results, civil servants show an average higher propensity to sickness
absence than private sector ones, and this higher propensity is not due to the contribution
of particular subgroups of civil servants, but can be summarized by a higher intercept.
In the next section, the identi¯cation issues faced when evaluating the impact of the two
reforms at study will be discussed.
13A Dependent Relative is de¯ned as a child below the age of 6 or an elderly above the age of 75.
14An epidemiological study using a 2005 cross-section of Italian workers (Costa et al., 2010) shows that,
net of composition e®ects, civil servants are more likely to experience sickness absence spells even after
controlling for several health-related variables, suggesting higher absence rates in the public sector are not
due to epidemiological factors.
145 Identi¯cation
The e®ects of the two subsequent reforms for civil servants will be evaluated using a Re-
gression Di®erences in Di®erences approach. In particular, the following equation will be
estimated:




it + qt + "it (5)
where the binary variable yit
15 is equal to one if individual i worked less than usual due
to sickness during the reference week of quarter t and zero otherwise, qt are quarter by
year interactions, Xit is a vector of socio-demographic and job related controls including
age, education, marital status, presence of a DR in the household, working region, tenure
(linear and quadratic), type of contract, contractual hours (linear and quadratic) and ¯rm
size. The average e®ect of belonging to the public sector in quarter t is captured by the
parameter °, coe±cient of the PUBit dichotomic variable equal to one if the employee works
for the public sector and zero otherwise. The dummies PUBA1 and PUBA2 are interactions
between PUB and two dummy variables equal to one during phase 1 (2008:Q3-2009:Q2)
and phase 2 (2009:Q3-2009:Q4) of the reform. As a consequence, coe±cients ¸1;2 capture
any systematic variation in absence rates taking place during phase 1 and 2 of the reform
at study compared to pre-reform levels:
¸x = E[yitjPUB = 1;dAx = 1] ¡ E[yitjPUB = 1;dB = 1] ¡
E[yitjPUB = 0;dAx = 1] ¡ E[yitjPUB = 0;dB = 1];x = 1;2 (6)
where dB is equal to one during the pre-reform period and zero otherwise.
In order to address the eventual downward bias in the standard errors due to within
individual correlation over time, throughout the analysis standard errors are clustered at
the individual level following White (1980), as suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004). For the
causal interpretation of the results, three identifying conditions have to be met (Blundell
and Macurdy, 1999; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005):
Condition 1. Conditional on the controls Xit and qt, the treatment (PUB = 1) and the
control (PUB = 0) group have a similar trend in sickness absence before the introduction
of the new policy;
15See section 4 for details.
15Condition 2. Conditional on the controls Xit and qt, the introduction of the policy under
evaluation does not alter the treatment and the control group composition in terms of
propensity to experience sickness absence in a systematic way;
Condition 3. The reform does not trigger spill-over e®ects between the treatment and the
control group.
5.1 Common trend
In order to empirically test Condition 1, a regression on the pre-reform period is run iden-
tical to the one reported in Table 2, but adding a linear and a quadratic trend interacted
with the dummy PUB. These controls should capture any systematic change in relative pub-
lic/private absence rates taking place over time before the reform. Point estimates for both
coe±cients are very close to zero and are statistically not-signi¯cant, providing no evidence
of the existence of a trend in relative public/private sector absence rates. As an additional
robustness check, a more °exible speci¯cation is adopted, substituting the linear and the
quadratic trends with a full set of PUB ¤qt interactions for each of the 18 quarters prior to
the introduction of the 133=2008 law. The hypothesis of a common trend in absence rates
cannot be rejected if the interactions are not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, that is, each of
quarter di®erences in absence rates between the control and the treatment group is constant
conditional on the controls and on the (common) quarter by year ¯xed e®ects. Note that
this is also equivalent to a falsi¯cation exercise on the pre-reform period, given that system-
atic changes in the relative public/private sector absence rates in the after reform period
will quantify the e®ects of the reform on average absence rates (section 6). The estimated
values for the interactions, reported in Table 3, show that the hypothesis of the presence
of a common trend in absence rates before the reform cannot be rejected, with parameter
estimates never statistically di®erent from zero, in any of the 18 quarters. An F-test of all
the interactions being jointly equal to zero does not reject the null (p value=0.556). Given
that we cannot reject the hypothesis of a common trend in the control and the treatment
group in the 18 quarters preceding introduction of the new provisions, for computational
ease we will restrict the policy evaluation sample to the 6 quarters preceding the new law
(2007:Q1-2008:Q2) and the 6 quarters following it (2008:Q3-2009:Q4).
165.2 Sorting e®ects
Condition 2 will now be tested detecting the possibility of systematic sorting e®ects across
sectors and labour market states triggered by the reform. Conditional on labor market state
in t¡4, four equations are estimated through LPM (Table 4). The ¯rst two of them estimate
the probability of leaving the public (private services) sector to any other state during the
[t¡4;t] interval, and detect any systematic variation in these transitions for individuals who
reported sick in t ¡ 4. The aim is to test whether the probability of quitting the control
or treatment group increased during the reforms for workers with a systematically di®erent
propensity to report sick. As discussed in the previous section, if this were the case, there
would be non random attrition, a potential source of bias.
The other two equations estimate the probability of being in the public (private services)
sector in t, conditional on being employed, but not in that sector, in t ¡ 4. Note that the
last two equations are not symmetric with respect to the ¯rst ones, since sickness absence in
t ¡ 4 can be observed for employed individuals only. This is the reason why the estimating
sample is restricted to individuals employed in t¡4. This set of equations complements the
previous one, checking whether the probability of entering the control (treatment) group
changed during the reforms for individuals with a systematically di®erent propensity to
report sick.
The longitudinal dimension of the dataset at hand is exploited, restricting the analysis
to individuals who have been interviewed at least twice in a one year interval (75 per
cent of the whole sample). For these individuals, employment status in t-4 together with
eventual sickness absence in the same period is observed. Formally, the following equation
is estimated:





i;t¡4 + qt + "it (7)
where yi;t = 0 de¯nes the four di®erent transitions at study. In the public (private services)
sector to other state transitions it is equal to zero if the individual was employed in the
public (private services) sector in t ¡ 4 and is still employed in the same sector in t, while
it is equal to one if the individual left that sector to any other status. Viceversa, in the two
opposite transition equations it is equal to one if the individual moved from any other sector
17in t ¡ 4 to the public (private services) sector in t, while it is equal to zero if the individual
did not experience this transition and was not employed in the public (private services)
sector in t ¡ 4. The right hand side of the equation includes the usual socio-demographic
and job related characteristics Xi;t¡4, and quarter by year dummies qt. SICKABSi;t¡4 is
a dummy variable equal to one if the worker experienced sickness absence in t ¡ 4 and
zero otherwise. This variable captures any di®erential mobility pattern for individuals who





i;t¡4, respectively the interaction between the dummy SICKABSi;t¡4 and the
dummies dA1 (equal to one during phase 1 of the reform) and dA2 (equal to one during phase
2 of the reform). These two variables would detect any di®erential mobility pattern taking
place during the two post reform phases for individuals who were sick in t¡4. A signi¯cant
coe±cient for these variables would entail a systematic change in the probability of changing
sector or labour market status during the reform period for workers more exposed to sickness
absence. This would provide evidence of workers' sorting as a result of the reforms.
Estimates show that the probabilities of moving from the public sector (t ¡ 4) to any
other state in t (column 1 of Table 4) are lower in the South of Italy and are higher for part-
time and temporary workers, while decrease with tenure. On average, civil servants who
report to have worked less than usual in t¡4 because of sickness do not have a signi¯cantly
higher probability of changing sector or leaving employment in t, and no di®erential pattern
is detected during the two phases of the reform at study. For workers employed in the
private services sector in t ¡ 4, the probability of experiencing a transition to any other
state is on average not signi¯cantly di®erent for individuals who reported to be sick in t¡4
(column 3), but it increases signi¯cantly by 7.4 and 9.4 percentage points respectively during
phase 1 and phase 2 compared to the pre-reform period. A higher propensity to leave the
private services sector (the control group) during the t;t ¡ 4 interval for individuals who
reported to be sick in t ¡ 4 might introduce (if anything) a downward bias in the policy
evaluation exercise if the propensity to be sick is assumed to be correlated over time. Finally,
the transitions into the treatment and the control groups are analysed (columns 2 and 4).
The only signi¯cant change in transitions that is relevant for identi¯cation is detected with
respect to workers moving into the public sector. During the phase 1 of the reform, the
likelihood of experiencing this transition signi¯cantly increased by 0.5 percentage points
for individuals who reported sickness absence in t ¡ 4. The coe±cient increases to 0.95
18percentage points during phase 2. Also in this case, this result might introduce, if anything,
a downward bias in the policy evaluation exercise.
The e®ects of eventual departures from Condition 3 will be assessed in section 6.3. As a
¯nal caveat, it is likely that the total incidence of sickness absence is a®ected by truncation
of short sickness spells, given that the data at hand have low frequency (weeks) compared
to the event at study (days). Nevertheless, there is no reason to expect that the extent of
truncation changes systematically because of the reform. If anything, since the wage penalty
introduced by the new policy is the highest for absence spells below 10 days, the presence of
truncation of short spells is expected to introduce a downward bias in the policy evaluation
exercise.
6 Results
6.1 Average treatment e®ects
Having discussed the conditions underlying the causal interpretation of the reform's e®ects
it is now possible to present the results obtained estimating equation 5 on the full sample
(column 1 of Table 5).
Conditional on observables, civil servants have 0.65 percentage points higher probability
of reporting sick at work. The coe±cient of the variable PUB ¤ A1, identifying the average
e®ect of the reform in its phase 1 setting, is negative and signi¯cant at 1% level. Accord-
ing to the estimate, during phase 1 of the reform, when monetary incentives were coupled
with increased monitoring, sickness absence incidence decreased exactly by 0.66 percentage
points, eliminating the di®erence with private services sector workers conditional on observ-
ables. On the contrary, during phase 2 of the reform, in which only monetary incentives
were in place and monitoring went back to the pre-reform period, there was a neat rebound
in absence rates. In this case, the variation compared to the pre-reform period drops to
-0.15 percentage points, statistically non signi¯cant at standard con¯dence levels. A formal
test of the variation in absence rates taking place in phase 2 being equal to the one occurred
during phase 1 rejects the null at the 5% level. These patterns are con¯rmed when esti-
mation is performed on a sub-sample excluding individuals with tenure shorter than a year
(column 2). This robustness check is meant to test the robustness of the results restricting
the sample to individuals who have terminated their probation period, thus enjoying higher
19EPL levels.
In order to test for the presence of substitution between sickness absence and other types
of absence, an identical set of regressions is run where the dependent variable is absence for
reasons other than sickness.16 No signi¯cant shift to other types of absences as a response
to the sickness absence policy reforms is found, both on the full sample and on the sample
including only workers with tenure longer than a year (respectively, columns 3 and 4 of
Table 5).
These results point unambiguously to the fact that monitoring e®ectiveness is the driving
force in determining presence at work. Nevertheless, they are compatible with the presence
of attenuation bias in the reform e®ects, an eventuality that is explicitly addressed in section
6.2, while section 6.3 assesses the e®ects of another potential source of bias, the presence of
spillover e®ects of the reform on the control group.
6.2 Attenuation bias
A potential explanation for the evidence presented in the previous section would be the
presence of attenuation bias, assuming that the reform might have had a strong impact on
sickness absence rates at its introduction, then decreasing over time. This could determine
previous results, implying that the dynamics detected between phase 1 and phase 2 of
the reform are not a genuine response to a change in the incentives' scheme, but merely the
result of workers adjusting over time to the stricter policy. In order to detect this possibility,
equation 5 is estimated with a slightly di®erent speci¯cation. Instead of estimating the two
step dummies interacting PUB with dA1 and dA2, and capturing the average e®ect of the
reform during the two subsequent phases of the reform, the PUB variable is interacted with
a full set of quarter dummies for the whole evaluation period. Had the reforms' e®ect been
fading over time, this should be evident in the estimates, slightly decreasing quarter after
quarter. Results reported in column 1 of Table 6 show that this is not the case. According
to coe±cients estimated for the quarter by quarter interactions, the impact of the reform
was negative (-0.3 percentage points in sickness absence incidence), but not signi¯cant, in
the ¯rst quarter since its introduction. It then increased substantially in the second quarter
(-0.61 percentage points, a result signi¯cant at the 10% level), to reach its maximum in
the last two quarters of phase 1, when the decrease in absence rates, compared to the
16See section 4 for a de¯nition of the variable.
20pre-reform values, was equal to 0.85 and 0.86 percentage points, respectively signi¯cant at
the 5 and 1% level. During phase 2 of the reform, when monitoring was set back to the
pre-reform period, the quarter by PUB interactions are no longer signi¯cant, and point
estimates become lower in absolute value (-0.10 and -0.19 respectively in the ¯rst and the
second quarter). A formal test of the e®ects of the reform being equal in the last quarter of
phase 1 and in the ¯rst quarter of phase 2 rejects the null at the 5% con¯dence level. The
drastic change in coe±cient estimates between the last quarter of phase 1 and the ¯rst one
of phase 2 suggests that the results are genuinely due to the change in the incentive scheme
and not to reform's e®ects fading over time. These results rule out also the possibility of
announcement e®ects driving the results. In the last quarter of phase 2, the announcement
of stricter rules to take place in the following year (outside the evaluation period),17 might
have pushed workers to increase absence rates when monitoring was at a comparatively
low levels. If this were the case, the decrease in workers' attendance found during phase 2
could be due to these announcement e®ects and not to the change in the incentive system.
Nevertheless, the coe±cient estimate does not change signi¯cantly between the ¯rst and the
second quarter of phase 2, providing evidence for the fact that the rebound in absence rates
taking place when monitoring was reduced to pre-reform levels is not driven by workers
anticipating future stricter rules.
The overall pattern does not change when restricting the sample to workers with tenure
shorter than a year (column 2). Also with this speci¯cation, no shift to other types of
absence is detected (columns 3 and 4).
6.3 Spillovers
Finally, the eventual existence of spillovers, preventing correct identi¯cation, is taken into
consideration.18 An increasing media-pressure on absenteeism triggered by the reform might
for example have put a downward pressure on private services workers' absence rates (the
control group) during the evaluation period. These indirect interactions are very di±cult to
disentangle empirically. Nevertheless, if present, indirect e®ects of this kind would introduce
a downward bias in the magnitude of the estimates of the reform at study. Implications
could be less clear at the household level, where the sign of spillovers from the civil servant
17See section 2. Figure 1 shows that the announcement was widely followed by the public.
18See condition 3 of section 5.
21partner to the private sector one are a priori unclear and determined by three di®erent
elements:
- between partner substitution in absence behavior, determined for example by the necessity
of staying at home for taking care of Dependent Relatives. The increase in relative price of
absence for the public sector workers might have induced substitution in absence between
partners if one of them works in the private sector. In this case, an increase in absence rates
in the private sector is expected as a result of the reform, determining an upward bias in
the policy evaluation estimates;
- between partner complementarities in absence behavior, if partners prefer to spend their
time absent from work together. In this case a decrease in the private sector absence rates
is expected, implying a downward bias in the reform e®ects' estimates;
- changes in absence behaviour in the reference group: the stricter policy on absenteeism
might have increased the psychological cost of opportunistic behaviour within the household,
decreasing the propensity to be absent for both partners, irrespective of sector of employ-
ment, when one of them works for the public sector, implying a downward bias in the reform
e®ects' estimates.
Negative (positive) spillover e®ects of the reform on absence rates of private sector workers,
the control group in the policy evaluation exercise, would induce a downward (upward) bias
in the estimates of the relevant policy parameter, violating Condition 3 for identi¯cation,
as outlined in section 5.
In order to check the robustness of the section 6.1 results to this kind of bias, equation 5
is re-estimated dropping all the observations regarding so called mixed couples, in which one
partner works in the private and one in the public sector. In this case, average absence rates
are 0.77 percentage points higher in the public than in the private services sector (column 1
of Table 7). During phase 1 of the reform, this di®erence is eliminated with a 0.78 percentage
points decrease in absence rates, a result signi¯cant at the 1% level. Again we ¯nd a neat
rebound in sickness absence during phase 2 of the reform, when the probability for a civil
servant to report sick decreased by only 0.26 percentage points compared to the pre-reform
period, a result that is statistically non-signi¯cant. A formal test of this variation in absence
rates being equal to the one estimated for phase 1 rejects the null at the 5% level. Results
are con¯rmed when dropping from the sample all workers with tenure shorter than a year
(column 2). Finally, we do not ¯nd any signi¯cant variation in absences for reasons other
22than sickness during the reform period (columns 3 and 4).
7 External validation
Results of the econometric analysis entail strong reform e®ects, providing clean evidence
for the fact that, at least for Italian civil servants, the main determinant of presence at
work is monitoring rather than monetary incentives. Such a study can be performed only
using the dataset at hand, a unique source providing homogeneous information on sickness
absence both for the private services and the public sector. Nevertheless, it is useful to use
alternative datasets to look for evidence able to con¯rm or contradict the main empirical
results obtained in this paper. According to government's o±cial data,19 during phase 1
of the reform at study, days of sickness absence diminished on average by 38 per cent
compared to a year earlier. During the ¯rst 5 months of phase 2 (July to November), there
was instead an average 30 per cent increase on the same period of the previous year, slowing
to +8 per cent in December. Administrative data on their own employees collected by the
Social Security Agencies and the Fiscal Agencies,20 subsectors of the Public Administration
employing around 30 thousand people each, convey a similar picture.
Also results presented in Del Boca and Parisi (2010) and De Paola et al. (2009), two
articles evaluating the e®ects of the reform on di®erent datasets, are coherent with the
main ¯ndings of this paper. These articles have the advantage of relying on administrative
datasets. Nevertheless, the analysis carried out here is more general since it uses a sample
with homogenous and broadly representative information on the control and the treatment
groups. Del Boca and Parisi (2010) make use of two personnel datasets coming respectively
from a security company (control group) employing slightly less than 3 thousand workers and
from the Fiscal Agencies data (30 thousand employees). They ¯nd a 20 per cent decrease in
absence rates during phase 1 of the reform, and a reversal when monitoring was loosened.
De Paola et al. (2009) use instead time series variation in absence rates for a local branch
of the public administration employing 860 workers to identify the e®ects of the phase 1 of
the reform, ¯nding a 50% decrease in absence.
19Ceci and Giungato (2010).
20See Fioravanti et al. (2010) and Dongiovanni and Pisani (2010).
238 Conclusions
This paper provides evidence on the relative importance of monitoring vs. monetary incen-
tives in determining a basic measure of workers' e®ort: presence at work.
Italian civil servants have higher sickness absence rates compared to private sector work-
ers with comparable characteristics. In an e®ort to reduce this wedge, a reform took place
in June 2008, lowering by an average 20% sickness insurance replacement rates for the ¯rst
ten days of continuous absence and intensifying monitoring on individuals reporting sick.
After exactly one year, a partial amendment to the reform brought monitoring levels back
to the pre-reform setting, while the cut in replacement rates remained unchanged. The
two subsequent and unanticipated changes in sick insurance policy concerning about 20 per
cent total employees provide a clear experimental setting. According to our (conservative)
estimates, based on a regression di®erences in di®erences approach with the private services
sector as the control group, absence rates dropped on average by 26.4 per cent when the
reform introduced both monetary disincentives and stricter monitoring. This drop was re-
versed when, a year later, monitoring levels were reduced to the pre-reform level, suggesting
this last element of the reform was the e®ective one in addressing absence. These ¯ndings
are not driven by attenuation bias and survive a variety of robustness checks, while no shift
to other types of absence as a consequence of the reforms is detected.
These results are relevant for the literature on incentives. Previous studies focussing
on the relative importance of monitoring and incentives in determining workers' e®ort are
limited either by endogeneity, when based on equilibrium quantities resulting from workers'
and ¯rms' optimization problems, or by a lack of generality, when exploiting results of
laboratory experiments. Since US and Western European civil servants seem to share with
their Italian colleagues a higher propensity to report sick compared to the private sector,
this policy evaluation exercise provides insights on how to draw a successful strategy for
reducing absenteeism.
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Note: The ¯gure reports the incidence of queries for the keywords "sickness absence" and "sickness absence checks" (In
Italian, "assenza per malattia" and "visite di controllo", respectively) over total queries performed in Italy through the Google
search engine. Values are normalized to 100 for the week in which the incidence was the highest (Google data available at
http://www.google.com/insights/search/.). The ¯rst vertical line identi¯es the week in which the Phase 1 of new sickness
absence policy was introduced, the second line identi¯es introduction of Phase 2 of the policy, while the third line marks the
week in which the government announced a new change in sickness absence policy to be introduced in 2010 (not in the time
interval analysed here).












































































































































































































































































Note: Author's calculations on Istat, Labour Force Survey. The ¯gure reports average sickness absence rates in the public and
the private services sectors. The ¯rst and the second green vertical lines identify respectively the quarter of introduction of



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Contractual hours -0.073 -0.07
[2.57]** [2.48]**
Contractual hours2=100 0.072 0.07
[2.09]** [2.04]**






Age 25-34 0.304 0.281
[2.75]*** [2.53]**
Age 35-44 0.459 0.464
[3.50]*** [3.53]***
Age 45-54 0.649 0.654
[4.38]*** [4.41]***














11 to 15 employees 0.335 0.335
[3.04]*** [3.05]***
16 to 19 employees 0.456 0.457
[2.81]*** [2.82]***
20 to 49 employees 0.461 0.462
[4.74]*** [4.75]***
50 to 249 employees 0.581 0.584
[6.19]*** [6.21]***
250 or more employees 0.797 0.801
[6.61]*** [6.64]***























Notes: Author's calculations on ILFS data. LPM regression for the probability of being absent. Robust t statistics in
brackets based on standard errors clustered at the individual level following White (1980). DR stands for Dependent
Relative(s). Includes only white collar employees not employed in the army or manufacturing; individuals working
in the health care or education sector, or otherwise absent from work for reasons outside their control are excluded
(see section 4 for details on sample selection). Includes a full set of quarter by year interactions. a the worker is not
able to recall exact ¯rm size. * signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.








































F test: all int.=0
Pvalue 0.5563
Observations 202863 202863
Notes: LPM regression for the probability of being absent. Columns one and two report parameter estimates for
a model equal to the one of Table 2, column 1, augmented respectively with an interaction between PUB and a
linear/quadratic trend and a full quarter by PUB interactions. Includes only white collar employees not employed
in the army or manufacturing; individuals working in the health care or education sector, or otherwise absent from
work for reasons outside their control are excluded (see section 4 for details on sample selection). Robust T statistics
in squared brackets based on standard errors clustered at the individual level following White (1980). * signi¯cant
at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
33Table 4: Test for sorting e®ects
Treatment group Control group
Column 1 2 3 4
Transition Public (t-4) Other state (t-4) Private (t-4) Other state (t-4)
to to to to
Other state (t) to Public (t) to Other state (t) to Private (t)
SICKABS 3.495 -0.256 1.455 -0.54
[1.61] [2.31]** [0.86] [2.20]**
SICKABSA1 1.358 0.517 7.384 0.088
[0.41] [1.96]** [2.28]** [0.23]
SICKABSA2 -3.121 0.954 9.46 0.313
[0.82] [2.02]** [1.89]* [0.63]
Woman -0.403 0.004 0.932 0.03
[0.85] [0.10] [2.45]** [0.35]
Center -0.678 0.143 0.56 0.012
[1.11] [2.85]*** [1.18] [0.10]
South -0.889 0.158 1.847 -0.448
[1.84]* [3.87]*** [4.28]*** [5.61]***
Contractual hours -0.153 -0.515
[0.58] [3.82]***
Contrac. hours2=100 0.001 0.005
[0.53] [3.63]***
High education 0.599 0.297 0.545 1.039





Temp 4.608 0.045 6.796 0.164
[3.61]*** [0.90] [7.69]*** [1.27]
Part time 3.006 0.001 -1.235 0.807
[1.91]* [0.03] [1.32] [4.68]***
Observations 18368 187149 39422 132375
Notes: LPM for the probability of experiencing the transition speci¯ed in the header. Includes a constant and additional quarter
by year ¯xed e®ects and ¯rm size dummies. Includes only white collar employees not employed in the army or manufacturing;
individuals working in the health care or education sector, or otherwise absent from work for reasons outside their control are
excluded (see section 4 for details on sample selection). Robust T statistics in squared brackets based on standard errors clustered
at the individual level following White (1980). * signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
34Table 5: The causal e®ect of the 133/2008 law on public sector absenteeism:
whole sample
Sickness absence Other absence
Column 1 2 3 4
PUB 0.651 0.657 -0.255 -0.261
[4.51]*** [4.46]*** [2.41]** [2.42]**
PUB*A1 -0.662 -0.66 0.068 0.09
[3.34]*** [3.26]*** [0.46] [0.59]
PUB*A2 -0.146 -0.23 0.131 0.119
[0.57] [0.88] [0.66] [0.57]
DR 0.642 0.671 4.484 4.646
[5.80]*** [5.85]*** [26.92]*** [26.87]***
Part time -0.491 -0.496 -0.615 -0.664
[2.52]** [2.43]** [2.87]*** [2.91]***
Temp -0.154 -0.081 -0.888 -0.842
[1.34] [0.59] [7.79]*** [6.04]***
Woman 0.511 0.51 2.43 2.535
[6.32]*** [6.01]*** [29.72]*** [29.39]***
High edu -0.25 -0.229 0.208 0.215
[2.76]*** [2.40]** [2.01]** [1.97]**
Tenure 0.047 0.047 0.048 0.02
[3.31]*** [3.02]*** [3.56]*** [1.36]
Tenure2=100 -0.1 -0.099 -0.135 -0.058
[2.26]** [2.12]** [3.96]*** [1.57]
Constant 2.515 2.411 -0.464 -0.476
[3.41]*** [3.13]*** [0.78] [0.72]
Observations 133521 126623 133521 126623
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of work dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family composition dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter*Year interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tenure<= 1 Included Not Included Included Not Included
Notes: LPM for the probability of experiencing the absence speci¯ed in the header. Includes only white collar
employees not employed in the army or manufacturing; individuals working in the health care or education sector,
or otherwise absent from work for reasons outside their control are excluded (see section 4 for details on sample
selection). Robust T statistics in squared brackets based on standard errors clustered at the individual level following
White (1980). * signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
35Table 6: The causal e®ect of the 133/2008 law on public sector absenteeism:
quarterly interactions
Sickness absence Other absence
Column 1 2 3 4
PUB 0.652 0.657 -0.254 -0.261
[4.51]*** [4.46]*** [2.40]** [2.41]**
PUB*2008:Q3 (A1) -0.326 -0.32 0.19 0.186
[1.16] [1.10] [0.81] [0.76]
PUB*2008:Q4 (A1) -0.608 -0.594 0.083 0.104
[1.91]* [1.81]* [0.35] [0.42]
PUB*2009:Q1 (A1) -0.852 -0.872 0.198 0.238
[2.54]** [2.57]** [0.87] [1.03]
PUB*2009:Q2 (A1) -0.861 -0.838 -0.198 -0.17
[2.84]*** [2.72]*** [0.94] [0.79]
PUB*2009:Q3 (A2) -0.101 -0.108 0.061 0.025
[0.32] [0.34] [0.24] [0.10]
PUB*2009:Q4 (A2) -0.188 -0.346 0.197 0.207
[0.55] [0.99] [0.82] [0.83]
DR 0.641 0.669 4.484 4.647
[5.79]*** [5.84]*** [26.92]*** [26.87]***
Part time -0.491 -0.495 -0.614 -0.663
[2.52]** [2.43]** [2.87]*** [2.91]***
Temp -0.154 -0.083 -0.888 -0.843
[1.35] [0.60] [7.79]*** [6.05]***
Woman 0.512 0.51 2.43 2.535
[6.32]*** [6.02]*** [29.72]*** [29.39]***
High edu -0.25 -0.229 0.207 0.214
[2.76]*** [2.40]** [2.01]** [1.96]**
Tenure 0.047 0.046 0.048 0.02
[3.29]*** [3.02]*** [3.56]*** [1.36]
Tenure2=100 -0.1 -0.099 -0.134 -0.058
[2.25]** [2.11]** [3.95]*** [1.57]
Constant 2.513 2.407 -0.465 -0.478
[3.41]*** [3.12]*** [0.78] [0.72]
Observations 133521 126623 133521 126623
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of work dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family composition dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter*Year interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tenure<= 1 Included Not Included Included Not Included
Notes: LPM for the probability of experiencing the absence speci¯ed in the header. Includes only white collar
employees not employed in the army or manufacturing. The health care or education sector and those individuals
absent from work for reasons outside their control are excluded (see section 4 for details on sample selection). Robust
T statistics in squared brackets based on standard errors clustered at the individual level following White (1980). *
signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
36Table 7: The causal e®ect of the 133/2008 law on public sector absenteeism:
indirect test for spillover e®ects
Sickness absence Other absence
Column 1 2 3 4
PUB 0.769 0.777 -0.212 -0.216
[4.98]*** [4.93]*** [2.00]** [1.99]**
PUB*A1 -0.777 -0.777 0.022 0.03
[3.65]*** [3.58]*** [0.15] [0.20]
PUB*A2 -0.26 -0.333 0.06 0.042
[0.96] [1.20] [0.30] [0.20]
DR 0.619 0.645 4.464 4.635
[5.37]*** [5.41]*** [25.75]*** [25.72]***
Part -0.411 -0.407 -0.533 -0.582
[2.03]** [1.92]* [2.41]** [2.46]**
Temp -0.161 -0.096 -0.782 -0.732
[1.40] [0.69] [6.87]*** [5.22]***
Woman 0.509 0.507 2.391 2.501
[6.11]*** [5.80]*** [28.38]*** [28.07]***
High edu -0.263 -0.242 0.156 0.165
[2.83]*** [2.48]** [1.49] [1.50]
Tenure 0.055 0.058 0.055 0.028
[3.82]*** [3.70]*** [3.97]*** [1.82]*
Tenure2=100 -0.127 -0.134 -0.148 -0.075
[2.80]*** [2.78]*** [4.29]*** [1.97]**
Constant 2.341 2.21 -0.649 -0.663
[3.11]*** [2.81]*** [1.07] [0.98]
Observations 125634 118931 125634 118931
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of work dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family composition dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter*Year interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tenure<= 1 Included Not Included Included Not Included
Notes: LPM for the probability of experiencing the absence speci¯ed in the header. Includes only white collar
employees not employed in the army or manufacturing. The health care or education sector and those individuals
absent from work for reasons outside their control are excluded (see section 4 for details on sample selection). Robust
T statistics in squared brackets based on standard errors clustered at the individual level following White (1980). *
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